MISCELLANEOUS
I.

TRADE REGULATION

Since Wisconsin Statute section 100.18(1), relating to
fraudulent advertising, was enacted by the legislature in 1913,1
the only interpretation given to the statute has been a 1925
Opinion of the Attorney General.2 The position was taken then
that the statute applied only to printed representations. However, in 1945, section 100.18(1) was amended to include the
media of magazines, radio, and television. The statute was also
broadened to include other methods "similar or dissimilar" to
those specified. In addition to advertisements, the statute was
expanded to include "announcements, statements, or representations of any kind [made] to the public." 3
In State v. Automatic Merchandisersof America, Inc.,4 the
issue was whether Wisconsin Statute section 100.18(1) 5 applied
to oral representations made in private conversations to prospective purchasers of a seller's product. The State of Wisconsin sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from oper1. Wis. Laws 1913, .ch. 510.
2. Under former Wis. STAT. § 343.413 (1925), which was the forerunner of Wis.
STAT. § 100.18(1) 1971, prohibiting advertising of a certain type in a newspaper or other
publication, or in the form of a notice, poster, pamphlet, or letter, a verbal misrepresentation was not a violation of that section. 14 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 367 (1925). The statute
was based upon a model advertising law drafted by Printers Ink Magazine, and subsequently adopted in most states. Because of the source of such laws, they are today
commonly known as "Printer's Ink Statutes." Jeffries, Protection For Consumers
Against Unfair and Deceptive Business, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 559, 561 n. 12 (1974).
3. Wis. LAws 1945, ch. 399.
4. 64 Wis. 2d 659, 221 N.W.2d 683 (1974).
5. Wis. STAT. § 100.18(1) (1971) basically provides as follows:
No person [or] corporation . . .with intent to sell . . . any real estate, merchandise, securities, employment, service, or anything offered by such person
[or]corporation . . .directly or indirectly, to the public for sale, hire, use or
other distribution, or with intent to induce the public in any manner to enter
into any contract or obligation relating to the purchase, sale, hire, use or lease
of any real estate, merchandise, securities, employment or service, shall make,
publish, disseminate, circulate, or place before the public, or cause, directly or
indirectly, to be made, published . . .in this state, in a newspaper, magazine
or other publication, or in the form of a book, notice, handbill, poster, bill,
circular, pamphlet, letter, sign, placard, card, label, or over any radio or television station, or in any other way similar or dissimilar to the foregoing, an advertisement, announcement, statement or representation of any kind to the public
relating to such purchase, sale, hire, use or lease . . .which advertisement,
announcement, statement or representation contains any assertion, representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading. (Emphasis
added).
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ating their business in violation of section 100.18(1), and to
recover the pecuniary losses suffered by persons in Wisconsin
because of the alleged improper conduct of the defendants.
The complaint alleged that the defendants were engaged in
a marketing scheme to sell mechanical vending machines and
distributorships to Wisconsin residents at prices substantially
in excess of the actual value. The marketing scheme involved
the placing of advertisements in the classified section of newspapers. Persons responding to these advertisements were contacted at their homes by the defendants and presefited various
promotional materials and oral representations. The complaint
alleged that some of these promotional materials and oral representations were untrue, deceptive, or misleading.' The defendants demurred to the complaint on the ground that section
100.18(1) did not apply to private face-to-face conversations as
were involved in the defendants' dealings with the prospective
purchasers.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in upholding the injunction, concluded that section 100.18(1) was intended by the legislature to apply even to oral representations such as occurred
in this case. Noting that the 1945 amendment was intended to
reflect changes in marketing methods, the court felt that the
legislature intended "to protect the residents of Wisconsin from
any untrue, deceptive or misleading representations made to
promote the sale of the product."7 (Emphasis added).
The court also rejected the defendants' assertion that the
statute applied only to "dissemination to the public," and so
did not relate to statements made privately to prospective purchasers. Relying on Cawker v. Meyer,8 the court reasoned that
the individual action of one person can constitute "the public"
for purposes of the statute, but admitted the difficulty of defining the word "public." The court indicated that in order to
exclude oneself from the definition of public, the controlling
factor is whether there is some particular relationship between
the parties which would exclude those parties from the general
6. 64 Wis. 2d at 660, 221 N.W.2d at 684. The words "untrue, deceptive or misleading" in Wis. STAT. § 100.18(1) were attacked as being so imprecise as to be unconstitutionally vague in Carpets by the Carload, Inc. v. Warren, 368 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Wis.
1973). Judge Gordon refused to convene a three-judge panel on the ground that the
plaintiff's claims were "constitutionally insubstantial."
7. 64 Wis. 2d at 663, 221 N.W.2d at 686.
8. 147 Wis. 320, 133 N.W. 157 (1911).

TERM OF THE COURT

19761

populace for the purpose of the statute.' Cawker explained that
the scope of "the public" is such that it is not restricted to any
particular class of the community. Whether the parties fall
within any particular class will depend on the circumstances
of each case. As pointed out in a law review article on consumer
protection," the word "public" has been construed under comparable statutes to mean that any person who invites the trade
of the general populace in a given area, or who is engaged in
his principal business is dealing with the "public." Thus, it
appears section 100.18(1) does not extend to misrepresentations in connection with a casual or incidental sale of merchandise unrelated to the business of the seller. In this case, the
prospective purchasers had responded to the defendants'
notices in newspapers. Inasmuch as no special relationship existed between these people and the defendants which would
distinguish them as prospective purchasers from "the public"
which the legislature intended to protect, the statute was
applicable.
II.

ATTORNEY COMPENSATION

Recognizing that the prevailing average rate now charged
by attorneys in this state is $45 per hour, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in State v. Sidney," raised the rate of compensation for indigency defense in criminal cases from $20 per hour
to $30 per hour.'"
The appellant in Sidney was an attorney appointed in Milwaukee county to represent an indigent in probation revocation
proceedings. Subsequent to providing legal services, the attorney presented the county court with a petition for payment of
fees totalling $1,577.94. The petition contained an itemized list
of noncourt hours, court appearances, and expenses, accompanied by a detailed description of the type of service performed
as to each item. The trial court cut the bill to $310. The supreme court remanded the case on the grounds that the trial
court did not give full consideration to a determination of the
hours worked and did not base the fee on the proper rate of
3
compensation.'
9. 64 Wis. 2d at 664, 221 N.W.2d at 686.
10. Jeffries, Protection For Consumers Against Unfair and Deceptive Business, 57
MARQ. L. REV. 559, 561, n. 14 (1974).
11. 66 Wis. 2d 602, 225 N.W.2d 438 (1975).
12. Id. at 609, 610, 225 N.W.2d at 442.
13. Id. at 606, 225 N.W.2d at 440.
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The supreme court, however, clearly reinforced its rule' 4
that the trial judge has the responsibility in indigency cases of
determining what services were reasonably necessary, ascertaining the reasonable number of hours required to perform
those services, and fixing the rate of compensation.' 5 The court
6 for
also stressed the standard set forth in State v. DeKeyser"
trial courts and attorneys in discharging this responsibility:
Claims for legal services should be submitted to the court
by petition explaining the nature and extent of the work and
an itemized form showing not only the amount of time spent
but also the nature of the work and the problems involved in
sufficient detail so that it can be properly appraised and a
reasonable fee determined for the services. The facts so stated
should be considered prima facie evidence, and modifications, allowances, and disallowances of the items made by the
court and the reasons therefor should be set forth in writing
and an opportunity given to counsel to contest the modifications. Reasonable men may differ over the value of legal services and there is no question of an attorney's integrity involved when a court differs with him as to the necessity or
value of services rendered.' 7
The payment of attorneys' fees for counsel appointed to
represent an indigent criminal defendant is controlled, in part,
by the provisions of Wisconsin Statute section 967.06.18 Section
967.06(2) directs the court to fix the amount of compensation
"which shall be such as is customarily charged by attorneys of
this state for comparable service." This language does not require remuneration entirely comparable to what an attorney
14. State v. DeKeyser, 29 Wis. 2d 132, 138 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
15. 66 Wis. 2d at 607, 225 N.W.2d at 441. In Touchett v. E Z Paintr Corp., 14 Wis.
2d 479, 488, 111 N.W.2d 419, 423 (1961), a number of factors were listed which the trial
court should consider in making these determinations. The case involved a fee dispute
between an attorney and a private client.
16. 29 Wis. 2d 132, 138 N.W.2d 129 (1965).
17. Id. at 137, 138 N.W.2d at 131, cited at 66 Wis. 2d 608, 225 N.W.2d 441.
18. Wis. STAT. § 967.06 (1973) provides, in part, as follows:
(1) Counsel appointed to represent indigent defendants shall be compensated for services commencing with the time of their appointment.
(2) The judge or court under this section shall fix the amount of compensation for counsel appointed hereunder, which shall be such as is customarily
charged by attorneys of this state for comparable service, and shall provide for
the repayment of actual disbursements for necessary travel and other expense,
automobile travel to be compensated at not over 8 cents a mile. The certificate
of the clerk shall be sufficient warrant to the county treasurer to make such
payment.
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privately retained might receive from a client. According to
prior rulings by the court:
Comparable services we conclude mean not what is customarily charged a private client but such charge discounted
by some factor because of the certainty of payment from the
public treasury. . . .Again in State v. Kenney, supra, [24
Wis. 2d 172, 128 N.W.2d 450, (1964)] we held sec. 256.49 did
not require this court to apply the full minimum bar rates to
services rendered by court-appointed counsel and in that case
we used as a standard approximately two thirds of the minimum bar rates as a going rate for the representation of indigents in Rock county. 9
In Sidney, the court reemphasized its holding that legal services to indigent criminal defendants should be compensated
at a rate one-third below the prevailing rate charged for services to nonindigent clients, basing its reasoning on the fact of
certainty of payment from the public treasury, and on the further fact that "legal work of this nature is part of the general
obligation on the part of all lawyers to see that justice is done
in our criminal courts.""°
II.

COURT-AUTHORIZED TRANSPLANT OPERATIONS
2' presented the difficult

In re Guardianship of Pescinski
question of whether a court has the power to order a kidney
transplant involving an incompetent individual where no consent has been given by the incompetent or his guardian ad
litem, nor any benefit to the incompetent has been shown, but
where the dire need of the donee for the transplant has been
22
established.
In 1970, Elaine Jeske, the mother of six children, had both
her kidneys surgically removed because she was suffering from
a fatal kidney disease. Since that time, Mrs. Jeske had been
kept alive by a dialysis machine. Late in 1974, Mrs. Jeske's
doctors determined that the dialysis machine could no longer
keep her alive, and that death was imminent unless she received a transplanted kidney. Mrs. Jeske's parents, both over
sixty-five, were ruled out by her doctor as a matter of policy.
19. State v. DeKeyser, 29 Wis. 2d at 138, 138 N.W.2d at 132, cited at 66 Wis. 2d
606, 607, 225 N.W.2d 440, 441.
20. 66 Wis. 2d at 610, 225 N.W.2d at 442.
21. 67 Wis. 2d 4, 226 N.W.2d 180 (1975).
22. Id. at 5-6, 226 N.W.2d at 180.
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Mrs. Jeske's children, all minors, were similarly excluded. The
search narrowed to Elaine's two brothers and her sister.
The sister was excluded as a donor because she had diabetes. One brother was excluded because he suffered from a stomach disorder and did not care to be a donor. The other brother,
Richard Pescinski, was legally declared incompetent in 1958
and committed to Winnebago State Hospital. "He [had] been
a committed mental patient since that date, classified as a
schizophrenic, chronic, catatonic type."23 His mental capacity
was estimated to be age twelve. Tests established that Richard
was a suitable kidney donor. A hearing was held to decide
whether permission should be granted to perform the operation. The guardian ad litem would not consent to the transplant, and the county court held it did not have the power to
order the operation. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in a six to
one decision, affirmed the trial court.24
The supreme court's decision rested on the categorical
rejection of the doctrine of substituted judgment, the absence
of the real consent of the incompetent, and the absence of
evidence that the transplant would be beneficial to the incompetent.
Historically, the substituted judgment doctrine was used by
courts of equity to allow gifts of property belonging to an incompetent.2 It is an application of the maxim that equity will
speak for one who cannot speak for himself." The doctrine of
substituted judgment was raised by the appellant, who urged
the supreme court to adopt the reasoning of the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in Strunk v. Strunk.2 7 The Kentucky court
23. Id.
24. Id. at 7, 226 N.W.2d at 181.
25. The doctrine of substituted judgment is recognized in this country as the right
to act for the incompetent in all cases. It is broad enough to cover property and all
matters touching on the well-being of the ward. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148
(Ky. 1969).
26. The doctrine of substituted judgment apparently found its first expression in
the leading English case, Ex parte Whitehead, 2 Meriv. 99, 35 Eng. Reprint 878 (ch)
(1816). It was amplified in In re Earl of Carrysfort, 41 Eng. Reprint 418 (1840), where
the principle was applied for the benefit of one who was not next of kin to a "lunatic,"
but was a servant of the "lunatic" and was obliged to retire from his service by reason
of age and infirmity. The Chancellor permitted the allowance of an annuity out of the
income of the estate of the "lunatic" earl as a retirement pension to the servant.
Although no supporting evidence could be found, the court was satisfied that the Earl
of Carrysfort would have approved if he had been capable of acting himself. Annot.,
24 A.L.R.3d 863 (1969).
27. 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. 1969).
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held that a chancery court had sufficient inherent power to
authorize the operation by substituting its judgment for that
8
of a person incompetent to arrive at a decision for himself.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to adopt the concept of
substituted judgment by asserting that absent statutory authority, Wisconsin courts have no equitable power to invade
29
the estate or the body of an incompetent.
While Strunk and Pescinski were quite similar, there were
factual distinctions which were critical in supporting the opposite conclusions of the two courts. The Kentucky court found
that, under the circumstances, the operation would be psychologically beneficial to the incompetent. His well-being would
have been jeopardized more severely by the loss of his brother
than by the removal of a kidney.30 In the Pescinski case, there
was no evidence that Elaine's death would be psychologically
detrimental to Richard. Nor was there any evidence that
Elaine's life was vital to the continuity of Richard's improvement.
In its conclusion, the Wisconsin court held as follows:
In the absence of real consent on [the incompetent's] part,
and in a situation where no benefit to him has been established, we fail to find any authority for the county court, or
this this court, to approve this operation.3'
28. Id. at 148.
29. States which have rejected the doctrine are Texas, Ohio, Tennessee, and now
Wisconsin. In re Guardianship of Neal, 406 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966), per
curiam 407 S.W.2d 771, (Texas refused to apply the doctrine when a gift would have
saved the estate $240,000 to $480,000 in estate taxes); In re Beilsten, 145 Ohio 397, 62
N.E.2d 205 (1945), (The court refused to allow a ward's funds to be used to support
his adult daughter); Lewis v. Moody, 149 Tenn. 687, 261 S.W. 673 (1924), (The court
ruled it had no power to deal with surplus income of a ward's estate unless specifically
authorized by statute.).
30. 445 S.W.2d at 146-47. This was substantiated by a psychiatrist, in attendance
to the incompetent, who testified that in his opinion the death of the brother would
have "an extremely traumatic effect upon [the incompetent]." An amicus curiae from
the Department of Mental Health of the Commonwealth was also important:
Jerry Strunk, a mental defective, has emotions and reactions on a scale comparable to that of a normal person. He identifies with his brother, Tom; Tom is
his model, his tie with his family. Tom's life is vital to the continuity of Jerry's
improvement at Frankfort State Hospital and School.
The necessity of Tom's life to Jerry's treatment and eventual rehabilitation is
clearer in view of the fact that Tom is his only living sibling, and at the death
of their natural parents, now in their fifties, Jerry will have no concerned intimate communication so necessary to his stability and optimal functioning.

Id.
31. 67 Wis. 2d at 8-9, 226 N.W.2d at 182.
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The court gave no indication what it might do in the event real
consent was given by an incompetent or if a benefit had been
established. The court also failed to indicate what it meant by
real consent or what type of benefit would be sufficient.
One might question the necessity of establishing a benefit
to an incompetent in a situation where the death of another will
result simply because the recipient is unable to show that the
transplant would be beneficial to the incompetent, especially
when the risk to the incompetent is negligible and the need for
the transplant is unquestionable. Yet, a fear that mental
institutions will become storehouses of spare parts for those on
the outside, the memories of the medical experiments of the
Nazis in World War II are legitimate concerns of those who
have to make a very difficult decision. 2
Justice Day, in his dissenting opinion, underscored the
weakness in searching for a psychological benefit in order to
achieve an equitable result:
In the case before us, if the incompetent brother should happily recover from his mental illness, he would undoubtedly be
happy to learn that the transplant of one of his kidneys to his
sister saved her life. This at least would be a normal response
and hence the transplant is not without benefit to him. 3
To avoid this dilemma, Justice Day proposed five requirements
which, upon fulfillment, would allow a court to approve an
operation.3 4 They are as follows:
1. A strong showing that the proposed donee faces imminent death without the kidney transplant.
2. A showing that reasonable steps have been made to acquire a kidney from other sources.
3. A showing that the proposed donor is closely related by
blood to the proposed donee.
4. A shrwing that the proposed incompetent-donor is in
good health.
5. A showing that the operation is one of minimal risk to the
donor, and that the donor could function normally on one
kidney following such an operation.
On the problem of real consent, Justice Day stated that
32. Id. at 10-12, 226 N.W.2d at 183 (Day, J., dissenting). See, Note, 9 JOURNAL OF
309 (1969).
33. 67 Wis. 2d at 9-10, 226 N.W.2d at 183 (Day, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 10, 226 N.W.2d at 183 (Day, J., dissenting).
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"from such a record it is difficult to see how one could ever get
a meaningful 'consent' from the incompetent in this case."35
This requirement will be a problem whenever the potential
donor has been found legally incompetent to make decisions
regarding his person and property. One might assume from
Pescinski that if it can be established by sufficient evidence
that a transplant would be beneficial to the incompetent-donor
and in his best interest, the permission of the guardian will
satisfy the "real consent" requirement. This approach would
not be based on the doctrine of substituted judgment, but on
the rule that the guardian acts "loyally in the best interest of
his ward." 3
IV.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

Citizen environmental groups will be encouraged by the
court's opinion in Wisconsin's Environment Decade, Inc. v.
7
Public Service Commission of Wisconsin.1
Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, Inc. (hereinafter
WED), a nonprofit corporation engaged in public interest activities intended to improve the quality of the human and natural environment, filed a petition under Wisconsin Statute sections 227.15 and 227.16(1) for judicial review of certain decisions by the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin (hereinafter PSC) and certain proposals of the Wisconsin Public Service Corporation to place limitations on the sale of natural gas.
Essentially, WED claimed that the PSC's restrictions on the
use of natural gas failed to curb present wasteful use of natural
gas supplies and would encourage customers to turn to more
environmentally-damaging fuel.3
35. Id. at 12, 226 N.W.2d at 183 (Day, J., dissenting).
36. 67 Wis. 2d at 7, 226 N.W.2d at 181.
37. 69 Wis. 2d 1, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975).
38. Among the allegations of the petition are the following:
"8. That petitioner and petitioner's members, whose interests petitioner asserts herein, are directly affected and aggrieved by the orders sought to be
reviewed herein because;
"a. Said orders harm the environment by prematurely devouring the last,
dwindling reserves of natural gas, and by encouraging environmentally destructive practices such as strip mining to artificially and temporarily augment the
supply of natural gas via coal gasification.
"b. Said orders unduly discriminate against their responsible use of natural
gas in the future by allowing present profligate users of natural gas to prematurely exhaust the finite supply remaining.
"6A. That petitioner, on its own behalf, and on behalf of its members, has
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The Dane county circuit court granted PSC's motion to
dismiss the petition on the ground that WED was not a proper
party to bring the action in that the petition failed to state facts
sufficient to meet the requirements of sections 227.15 and
227.16(1) .3 The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the trial court for a determination of the truth of
the facts pertaining to standing alleged in the petition. If any
of the bases for standing alleged in the petition was factually
established, the court ordered that the trial court should then
consider the merits of the appropriate issues in WED's
petition. °
Sections 227.15 and 227.16(1) govern a motion to dismiss in
a proceeding to seek review of an administrative decision, and
raise the question whether the petition alleges facts sufficient
to show that the petitioner has standing. Both sections require
the petitioner to show a direct effect on his legally protected
interests. A person aggrieved has been defined as "one having
an interest recognized by law in the subject matter which is
injuriously affected by the judgment.""1 The Wisconsin rule of
standing envisions a two-step analysis. The first step is to ascertain "whether the decision of the agency directly causes
injury to the interest of the petitioner."42 The second step is to
interests in a healthful environment, an interest threatened by this order which
induces lower priority natural gas customers to switch to more environmentally
damaging alternative sources of energy."
69 Wis. 2d at 7-8, 230 N.W.2d at 246.
39. The reasons for dismissal were stated to be:
"... that petitioner is not a person aggrieved whose legal rights, duties or
privileges are directly affected by the orders of respondent Public Service Commission sought to be reviewed herein within the meaning of section 227.15, Wis.
Stats., and that it is not a person aggrieved or directly affected by said orders
within the meaning of section 227.16(1), Wis. Stats." 69 Wis. 2d at 7, 8, 230
N.W.2d at 247.
Wis. STAT. § 227.15 (1973) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Judicial review; orders reviewable. Administrative decisions, which directly affect the legal rights, duties or privileges of any person . . . shall be
subject to judicial review as provided in this chapter.
Wis. STAT. § 227.16(1) (1973) provides in pertinent part as follows:
Parties and proceedings for review. (1) Except as otherwise specifically
provided by law, any person aggrieved by a decision specified in s. 227.15 and
directly affected thereby shall be entitled to judicial review thereof as provided
in this chapter.
40. 69 Wis. 2d at 20, 230 N.W.2d at 253.
41. Greenfield v. Joint County School Commissioners, 271 Wis. 442, 447, 73
N.W.2d 580 (1955).
42. 69 Wis. 2d at 10, 230 N.W.2d at 248.
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determine "whether the interest asserted is recognized by
law." The court concluded that the law of standing in Wisconsin should not be construed narrowly or restrictively, and
quoted Professor Kenneth Culp Davis:
The only problems about standing should be what interests
deserve protection against injury, and what should be enough
to constitute an injury. Whether interests deserve legal protection depends upon whether they are sufficiently significant and whether good policy calls for protecting them or for
denying them protection.44
The court distinguished Wisconsin cases in which review
had been denied by noting that the statutes relied upon by
persons seeking review had not given legal recognition to the
interests asserted. Such denial thus rests on substantive statutory interpretation rather than on rules of standing.'5 In this
case, the court substantially liberalized the standing requirements, at least in the area of environmental law. The court also
indicted its willingness to accept the federal courts' viewpoint
that an allegation of injury in fact to aesthetic, conservational,
and recreational interests is readily accepted as sufficient to
confer standing." Even more significantly, the federal courts
have shown a willingness to find that environmental interests
are arguably within the zone of interests protected by virtually
any statute relating to environmental matters."
43. Id. This approach is similar to the two-pronged standing analysis outlined by
the United States Supreme Court in Association of Data Processing Service Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) as
follows: (1) Does the challenged action cause the petitioner injury in fact, economic or
otherwise? And (2) is the interest allegedly injured arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question?
44. 69 Wis. 2d 4, 13, 230 N.W.2d 243, 249 quoting DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW
TREATISE 722, sec. 22:00-4 (1970 Supp.).
45. See Mortensen v. Pyramid Savings and Loan Association, 53 Wis. 2d 81, 191
N.W.2d 730 (1971); Dressler v. WERB, 6 Wis. 2d 243, 94 N.W.2d 609, 95 N.W.2d 788
(1959); Ashwaubenon v. State Highway Commission, 17 Wis. 2d 120, 115 N.W.2d 498
(1962).
46. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972). There was a minority on the United States Supreme Court in Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Blackmun who would expand the traditional concepts of standing to enable an organization like the Sierra Club, possessing pertinent, bona fide, and
well recognized purposes in the area of environment, to litigate environmental issues
without alleging that its members are among those aggrieved by agency action. Such
a change, as Justice Blackmun said, "need only recognize the interest of one who has
a probable, sincere, dedicated, and established status." Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 757-8 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
47. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir.
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In applying the two-prong test, the court found that the
petition sufficiently alleged injuries that were a direct result of
PSC action."
This court and the federal courts have taken a similar
view of the directness requirement. Injury alleged, which is
remote in time or which will only occur as an end result of a
sequence of events set in motion by the agency action challenged, can be a sufficiently direct result of the agency's decision to serve as a basis for standing. The question whether the
injury alleged will result from agency action in fact is a question to be determined on the merits, not on a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. 9
In completing the standing analysis, the court found that the
interest asserted by WED is a legally recognized interest under
various provisions of Wisconsin Statute Chapter 19611 and the
Wisconsin Environmental Protection Act. 51 This legally protected interest was sufficiently alleged52 by statements that
members of WED reside in the area affected, and that the
PSC's action will result in environmental harm because of increased use of dirtier fuels and will curtail the interest of
WED's members to continue to enjoy adequate and sufficient
service through the conservation of natural gas. It is important
to note that the court construed chapter 196 as designed to
benefit the consuming public, consistent with its holding in
Wisconsin Power and Light Co. v. Public Service Commission5"
that ". . . the predominant purpose underlying the public utilities law is the protection of the consuming public rather than
the competing utilities." Regarding the Wisconsin Environmental Protection Act, the court stated:
1970) (Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act); Citizen's Committee for
Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970) (Department of Transportation Act,
The Hudson River Basin Compact Act).
48. 69 Wis. 2d at 7, 8, 230 N.W.2d at 247.
49. 69 Wis. 2d at 14, 230 N.W.2d at 250.
50. Certain sections of Wis. STAT. ch. 196 (1973) charge every public utility with
the responsibility of furnishing adequate and not insufficient service to customers.
51. Wis. LAWS 1971, ch. 274, § 1. WED also attempted to argue that its interest
was legally recognized because of the navigable waters public trust doctrine as developed by the court in Daly v. Natural Resources Board, 60 Wis. 2d 208, 208 N.W.2d
839 (1973). But the court was unwilling to adopt a rule that "any allegation of harm
to the environment raises, by implication, an allegation of harm to navigable waterways." 69 Wis. 2d at 15, 230 N.W.2d at 250.
52. 69 Wis. 2d at 7, 8, 230 N.W.2d at 247.
53. 45 Wis. 2d 253, 259, 172 N.W.2d 639, 641 (1969).

[T]he preamble of an act is instructive of legislative intent, and as such it must be considered that the legislature
intended to recognize the rights of Wisconsin citizens to be
free from the harmful effects of a damaged environment
where it can be shown that the person alleging injury resides
in the area most likely to be affected by the agency action in
question. Such is the situation in the instant case.-4
The final issue raised was whether WED has standing to
represent its members where the allegations of injury relate
solely to the members' individual interests. The court resolved
the issue by again adopting the federal view that if an organization, devoted to the protection and preservation of the
environment, alleges facts sufficient to show that a member of
that organization would have standing to bring the action in his
own name, the organization itself has standing to sue in its own
name.55
JOHN S. JUDE

MUNICIPAL LAW AND EMINENT DOMAIN
In the area of eminent domain, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court, during its last term, modified its previous position on
the issue of inverse condemnation in Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State
Highway Commission.1 Respondent Howell Plaza petitioned
the trial court to force the State Highway Commission to proceed with the condemnation of Howell Plaza's property, claiming that the land was already "occupied" by the Commission.
The supreme court pointed out that in order for such a request
to succeed in the initial stages of the inverse condemnation
proceeding, there must have been either a statutory occupation,' or a taking of the property such that compensation would
be required under the terms of the Wisconsin Constitution.
The respondent alleged that the conduct of the Highway
Commission in the various stages of plotting and planning the
freeway, short of actual possession, was sufficient deprivation
54. 69 Wis. 2d at 18, 230 N.W.2d at 252.
55. Id. at 20, 230 N.W.2d at 253.
1. 66 Wis. 2d 720, 226 N.W.2d 185 (1975).
2. Wis. STAT. § 32.10 (1973).

